He said that Parliament had approved the investment agreement and stated that “royalties are related to the duration of the underlying mining leases for specific gold mines,” and stated that only 16 gold mines will be affected, in which the government will receive annual royalties. [1] citinewsroom.com/2020/08/critics-of-agyapa-royalties-deal-lack-full-understanding-adu-boahen/ As part of the agreement, Ghana`s sovereign state intends to monetize a portion of its annual gold licences from certain mining concessions in order to obtain $500 million in equity (pre-cash) from private investors by placing shares in a newly created Special Vehicle Vehicle (SPV) unit to which the Ghanaian State will pay its royalties – later. Third, is there a government-guaranteed share repurchase option (MIIF) as soon as investors have recouped their investments after a certain period of time? Fourth, regardless of bankruptcy clauses or reserves, can private shareholders exercise their right to the underlying asset, which is Ghana`s mineral stake for the duration of the respective contracts, in the event of a problem? Essentially, I learn from the documents and information available that the state says mineral royalties are relatively too low, considering that they are supposed to invest in the possession of additional mines and value chain infrastructure, such as processing centres, new geological discoveries and transportation infrastructure. It is therefore necessary to adopt innovative approaches in order to obtain more funds for investments in mining infrastructure, in order to obtain a greater share of mining revenues without burdening public coffers. Ghana`s current challenges warrant unconventional thinking. But the many outstanding issues relating to the agreement and strong opposition to Parliament and civil society actors could effectively discourage investors and lead to a much worse valuation than would otherwise be possible by consensus. Further public consultations could improve the structure of the Agyapa agreement and fill gaps in the law to ensure that the people of Ghana ultimately benefit from their resources. Finally, under the Constitution, Ghana`s minerals are held in trust for the people of Ghana. He questioned why Parliament should review, review and approve five agreements on the last day of the session. The regulation, which was previously whipped by Parliament`s approval, despite the opposition`s exit, is now returned to the legislature. Civil society is calling on Parliament to reject the agreement and its transaction agreements altogether. In accordance with Section 3.1 of the Amended Investment Agreement (AIA), Miif will cede all rights and privileges and pay its share of the licence to Agyapa Royalties for the duration (duration) of the agreement (section 2.2 of the AIA). What fair value (“licence value”) assessment was established pursuant to Section 4 of the AIA for a value of $1 billion (“licence value”)? Is it based on cash flow or price/earnings (PE) valuation? The reasons given are “the lack of full disclosure of the economic ownership of the destination enterprise”[1] about how the institution in a tax haven sends the wrong signal to players in the country`s mineral value chain[2] and why “it is not good to use the nation`s resources to use our assets for tomorrow”[3], among others.
The minority also stated that no document could be confidential to Parliament and that there was no reason, even at the committee level, to review the terms of the prospectus to approve the agreement in accordance with Article 181, paragraph 5 of the Constitution, since it is an international transaction. The main parties to the agreement are: under the leadership of Deputy Minority Leader James Avedzi, the minority orchestrated an exit, but the agreement was pped by the majority.
