The stricter the rules, the more difficult it is to qualify and the more likely trade is to be deterred (although protectionist interests are happy). That is why much of the time at the conference has been devoted to harmonizing rules of origin through free trade agreements and within the WTO, while freeing them up to promote global public procurement. The cause of this phenomenon with regard to rules of origin lies in the creation of complex rules of origin. These complex rules reflect the industrial situation of each country concerned and can therefore be simplified if they are. Moreover, if they feel that these rules are too complex and unsuitable for their use, companies can still export their products without seeking preferential treatment. From the exporters` point of view, this is the privilege of exporting with lower and/or zero tariffs, an additional and preferable alternative to export, with a general tariff applicable under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This is an additional option, but no negative effects. Of course, the rules of origin that are easier to use would be preferable. But how can we compare the inconveniences to the use of the rules of origin with a bowl of spaghetti? Those who know only the world, governed by a single set of rules, the WTO agreements, believe that international rules are directly linked to national rules. Thus, they are misled into thinking that when a particular point or case is subject to different rules depending on the nationality of the persons concerned and the capital under international treaties, national regulations become complex. However, international rules are not necessarily directly linked to national rules implemented by individual countries to comply with international rules. If people fully understand this, there will not be arguments as insignificant as what should be done to prevent free trade agreements from causing the phenomenon of japanese-made spaghetti bowls with respect to IPR.
The conditions under Article XXIV are intended to weaken the manipulation of ATRs for protectionist purposes in a way that could weaken incentives for multilateral trade liberalization. And if these conditions are fully implemented, regional free trade could weaken import sectors, which could reduce their political influence while strengthening the influence of exporters who could benefit from regional liberalization and benefit even more from greater multilateral liberalization.